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MORALS CLAUSES FOR EDUCATORS IN SECONDARY 
AND POSTSECONDARY SCHOOLS: 
LEGAL APPLICATIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONCERNS 
Marka B. Fleming* 
Amanda Harmon Cooley** 
Gwendolyn McFadden- Wade*** 
"A teacher affects eternity; he can never tell where his 
influence stops."- Henry Adams 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Teachers have an extraordinary opportunity to impact the 
lives of their students on both the secondary and postsecondary 
level. Because of this unique role, teachers are frequently 
required to agree to morals clauses as a condition of 
employment. In general, morals clauses in employment 
contracts allow an employer to terminate employment when an 
employee's conduct is potentially detrimental to the employer's 
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1. HENRY BROOKS ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS 300 (Modern 
Library 2000) (1918). Modern conventions on the use of gender neutral language as 
adopted by the major citation systems and writing guides, such as The Bluebook 
system of citation and the Publication Manua l of the American Psychological 
Association, apply to the text of this article. However, many of the sources cited before 
these conventions took hold do not maintain gender neutrali ty. Citing to these sources 
is by no means an endorsement of gender-biased la nguage. 
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interest. 2 Within the educational sector, morals clauses are 
commonly imposed upon teachers through state statutory 
provisions requiring that teachers do not engage in "immoral 
conduct."3 Occasionally, morals clauses are imposed upon 
teachers through contractual provisions requiring that they 
comply with prescribed moral standards.4 
Recent media reports describing teachers engaging in drug 
use, sexual misconduct with students, and felonious criminal 
behavior would suggest that there is a need to require morally 
appropriate behavior from secondary and postsecondary school 
educators.5 Should a teacher be allowed to remain in his or her 
position if he or she engages in "immoral conduct"? Many 
secondary and postsecondary schools (both public and private) 
are answering this question in the negative, and are enforcing 
morals clauses against teachers who have demonstrated 
allegedly immoral behavior.6 Moreover, some schools have 
taken mandatory morality as a condition of employment a step 
further by implementing policies to "deter immorality," such as 
guidelines governing the relationship between students and 
t eachers 7 and procedures for compulsory drug testing of 
2. See Noah B. Kressler, Using the Morals Clause in Talent Agreements: A 
Historical, Legal and Practical Guide, 29 COLUM . J.L. & AHTS 235 (2005). 
3. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.170(a)(2) (2008) (stating that "[a] teacher, 
including a teacher who has acquired tenure rights, may be dismissed at any time . 
for ... immorality"). 
4. See, e.g., Howard M. Smulevitz, School Chief Gets [,anger Contract, 
INmANAPOLIS STAR, May 2, 2002, at B3 (describing how it is standard practice for a ll 
educational contracts in an Indiana school district to contain morals clauses). 
5. See, e.g. , Nichole Dobo, Three County Teachers Lose Certification , YORK DAILY 
RECORD (York, Pa.), Apr. 6, 2008, at 1 (describing how in 2004, a high school social 
studies t eacher resigned from the Dallastown Area School District in P ennsylvania 
after being accused of having a sexual relationship with a student and misusing a 
district computer and how, in 2006, a reading teacher resigned from the West Shore 
School District in Pennsylvania after the teacher allegedly attempted to kill her 
terminally ill husband, and pled guilty to reckless endangerment and drunk driving); 
see also Delano R. Massey, Ex-Teacher Pleads to Lesser Sex Counts: Faced Felony 
Charges of Abusing 3 Males in 70's, 80's, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Dec. 15, 2007, a t 
Al; ,Joe McDonald, ESU Professor Guilty of Sex Assault Against Student; ls Acquitted 
of Rape Charge. Lesser Crime Can Mean 10-Year Term, MORNING CALL (P a.) , Sept. 11, 
2007, at B6; Carla Rivera & Jason Song, Schools Try to Ease Fears After Arrests; 
Pasadena and Lynwood Campuses Respond When Two Veteran Teachers are Nabbed in 
Internet Child Porn Sting, Los ANGELES Tr.MES, Dec. 2, 2007 at B3; Substitute Teacher 
Facing Porn Charge, TULSA WORLD, Dec. 8, 2007, at A5. 
6. See, e.g. , ,James Roland, Popular Coach Let Go: A Baby Out of Wedlock 
Violates the Morals Clause, SARASOTA H EHALD-TRIBUNE, May 28, 2002. at A 1. 
7. See, e.g., UC Regents Approve Ban on Faculty Dating Students, SAN MATEO 
DAILY JOURNAL, July 18, 2003, at 1. 
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teachers. 8 
There are, however, constitutional uncertainties that exist 
when morality is a condition of employment. In these 
instances, many questions arise, such as: how is immorality 
defined; when does it apply; how much of a teacher's life can be 
regulated; and when has the school crossed the zone of privacy? 
Thus, the inclusion of morality as a condition of maintaining 
employment and the emerging policies discouraging immoral 
behavior raise significant constitutional concerns regarding 
their validity. 
This article will examine the influence of educators and 
their positions as role models, the legal applications of 
statutory morality provisions for secondary and postsecondary 
school teachers, and the implications of contractual morals 
clauses for secondary and postsecondary school teachers. 
Finally, the paper will analyze the overriding constitutional 
implications of imposing these morals clauses upon teachers. 
II. THE INFLUENCE OF TEACHERS AND THEIR POSITIONS AS 
ROLE MODELS 
In 2007, approximately 4.6 million teachers throughout 
America taught over 73 million students.9 These statistics are 
important because teaching is not just a "rote, mechanical 
conveyance of factual information from one mind to another." 10 
Rather, teaching is an important profession, in which the 
educator may serve as a role model, mentor, friend, and/or 
parental figure. 11 Indeed, teachers have an extraordinary 
responsibility: they "leave indelible impressions on the minds 
of their young students, because they are entrusted with the 
safe keeping and education of children during their most 
impressionable and formative years." 12 In explaining the 
8. S ee, e.g. , Angela Mack, Pender Schools to Drug Test: System Tahes Lead in 
Area for ScreeninR All New Employees, STAR· NEWS (Wilmington, N.C.) , May 10, 2005, 
at lB. 
9. S ee U.S. DEPARTMF;NT OF ED UCATiON, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION 
STATISTI CS, l'RO.H:CT!ONS OF EDUCATION STATISTICS TO 2016, TABLE 1 (2007), available 
at h ttp://nces.ed .gov/programs/digest/d07/ 
tables/dt07_001. asp?referrer=report (last visited May 3, 2008). 
10. Rogliano v. Fayette County Bd. of Educ., 347 S.E.2d 220, 226 (W. Va. 1986) 
(Neely, J ., dissent ing). 
11 . Sec, e.g. , Knox County Educ. Ass'n v. Knox County Bd . of Educ., 158 F.3d 36 1, 
384 (6th Cir. 1998). 
12. ld. 
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essential role of teachers, the United States Supreme Court 
has stated: 
A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There he 
shapes the attitude of young minds towards the society in 
which they live. In this , the state has a vital concern . It must 
preserve the integrity of the schools. That the school 
authorities have the right and the duty to screen the officials, 
teachers, and employees as to their fitness to maintain the 
integrity of the schools as a part of ordered society, cannot be 
doubted. 13 
As such, through the presentation of course material, 
teachers have a unique opportunity to influence students. 14 
Further, the mere presence of the teacher in the classroom 
sends a message to students in that the teacher "exert[s] a 
subtle but important influence over [the students'] perceptions 
and values." 15 Students, in part, acquire their social attitudes 
and other important behaviors by emulating their teachers' 
attitudes and by absorbing the substantive lessons of their 
teachers. 16 Thus, given their influence on students, "[teachers] 
are intended by parents, citizenry, and lawmakers alike to 
serve as good examples for their young charges." 17 
This expectation for educators is by no means a new 
proposition; historically, courts have noted that "it has always 
been the recognized duty of the teacher to conduct himself in 
such a way as to command the respect and good will of the 
community." 18 In fact, "[w]hen public schools were established 
13. Adler v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952) (reasoning that 
the Board of Education, as a municipal employer, was not precluded from inquiring of 
its employees as to matters that could prove relevant to their fitness and suitability for 
public service). 
14. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1979) (stating that "through both 
the presentation of course materials and the example he sets, a teacher has a n 
opportunity to influence the attitudes of students toward government, the political 
process, and a citizen's social responsibilities"). 
15. Id.; see also Bd. of Educ. of Cape Girardeau Sch. Dist. No. 6:3. v. Thomas, 926 
S.W.2d 1()3, 164-66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding the termination of a high school 
teacher for immoral conduct after she a llegedly shot her estranged husband, which was 
based in part on a finding that the teacher's "actions contradicted the message sent by 
the school district, presenting a 'do as I say, not as I do' dilemma for her students"). 
16. See Ambach, 441 U.S. at 79; see also Skoros v. City of N.Y. , 437 F. 3d l , 19 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (stating that New York City schools "play a particularly important role in 
teaching these essentia l elements of pluralism to future generations of Americans"). 
17. Faulkner v. New Bern-Craven County Bd. of Educ. , 316 S. E.2d 281 , 291 (N.C . 
1984); see also Barringer v. Caldwell County Bd. of Educ., 4 7::l S. E.2d 435, 440-41 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1996). 
18. Horosko v. Sch. Dist. of Mount Pleasant Twp. , 6 A.2d 866,868 (Pa. 19:39). 
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in the United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, one of their stated missions was to teach moral 
virtues." 19 In the early history of American education, teachers 
"were expected to teach and discipline their students to be 
respectful of authority and responsible in completing their 
lessons."20 By the early twentieth century, ardent calls for 
moral development and character education within the public 
schools came from a broad spectrum of educational 
philosophers, ranging from John Dewey to William Hutchins.21 
As the twentieth century progressed, these calls were 
heeded by state legislatures, which passed both character 
education statutes and educator employment statutes that 
required morality among teachers.22 The continued 
implementation of such legislation demonstrates that the 
historical, public expectations that teachers be morally upright 
individuals remain fundamentally the same today. Essentially, 
"[b]ecause of teachers' influential role[s] in the lives of young 
people, the public still expects teachers to display behaviors 
reflective of moral virtues, such as fairness and honesty, and to 
adhere to professional codes of conduct."23 
Ill. STATUTORY MORALS CLAUSES FOR SECONDARY AND 
POSTSECONDARY EDUCATORS 
For secondary and postsecondary school educators 
employed by public institutions, morals clauses are generally 
imposed through state statutes prohibiting the teachers from 
engaging in conduct that is criminal, immoral, or 
unbecoming.24 While courts may consider the educational level 
19. Angela Lumpkin, Teachers as Role Models Teaching Character and Moral 
Virtues , J . PHYSICAL EDUC., RECREi\'l'ION & DANCE, Feb. 2008, a t 45 (citing SCHOOL: 
THE STORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION (Sarah Mondale & Sarah B. Patton eds., 
2001): Young .Jay Mulkey, The History of Character Education, J. PHYSICAL Enuc ., 
RECHEATION & DANCE, Nov./Dec. 1997, at a5, a5-a7); see also Perry L. Glanzer & 
Andrew ,J. Milson, Legislating the Good: A Survey and Evaluation of Character 
Education Laws in the United States, 20 EDUC. POT:V 525, 527-29 (2006). 
20. Lumpkin, supra note 19, at 45. 
21. See, e.g., Mulkey, supra note 19, at 35- 37. 
22. See, e.g., 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.22(A)(7) (2008) (stating that "[s]ubject to the 
provi sions of the Teacher Due Process Act of 1990, a career teacher may be dismissed 
or not reemployed for ... commission of an act of moral turpitude"); see also Glanzer & 
Milson , supra note 19, at 529-42. 
28. Lumpkin, supra note 19, a t 45. 
24. See generally John D. Copeland & John W. Murry, Jr., Getting Tossed from 
the ivory Tower: The Legal implications of Evaluating Faculty Performance, 61 Mo. L. 
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(secondary or postsecondary) involved in determining whether 
grounds for discipline or dismissal exist, both secondary and 
postsecondary teachers have been disciplined or terminated 
pursuant to the enforcement of state morality statutes for 
behavior that includes sexual misconduct, corruption, drug use, 
abusive language, lying, criminal activity, and felony 
convictions. 25 
A. Statutory Provisions Governing Morality for Secondary 
School Teachers 
In many states, if a secondary school teacher engages in 
immoral behavior, this behavior constitutes grounds for 
disciplining the teacher. 26 The discipline can result in severe 
penalties, including suspension or revocation of the teaching 
certificate.27 Pursuant to certain state statutory schemes, 
immoral behavior also can constitute sufficient cause for 
terminating or suspending tenured teachers or teachers under 
a definite term contract.28 
Despite the panoply of state statutes that allow for the 
discipline and dismissal of secondary school educators based on 
immoral behavior, relatively few jurisdictions have statutes 
REV. 233, 259-60 (1996); Jason R. Fulmer, Dismissing the "Immoral" Teacher for 
Conduct Outside the Workplace~Do Current Laws Protect the Interest of Both School 
Authorities and Teachers?, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 271, 272-73 (2002). 
25. See Fulmer, supra note 24, at 271; Robert W. McGee, Academic Tenure: 
Should It Be Protected By Law?, 20 W. ST. U. L. REV. 593, 596 (1993). 
26. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.030(a)(2) (2008); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44421 
(2007); FLA. STAT. § 1012. 795(1)(c) (2008); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-23(a) (2008); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 20-28-5-7(1) (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1:~83 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS§ 13-42-9 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE§ 28A.410.090(1) (2008); W.VA. CODE§ 18A-3-
6 (2007); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 21-2-802(c) (2007). 
27. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.030 (a)(2) (providing that "[t]he commissioner 
or the Professional Teaching Practices Commission may revoke or suspend a certificate 
[for] ... immorality, which is defined as the commission of an act which, under the 
laws of the state, constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude"). 
28. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-24-8 (2008); CAL. EDUC. CODE§ 44427 (2007); COLO. 
RBN. STAT. § 22-63-301 (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14 §§ 1411, 1420 (2008); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 20-2-940(a)(4) (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-609 (2008); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/10-22.4 (2008); IND. CODE ANN.§ 20-28-7-l(a)(1) (2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANC\1. § 
156.132(1) (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:443(A) (2008); MD. CODE ANN. EDUC. § 6-
202(a)(1)(i) (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. § 391.312 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-
325(e)(l)(b) (2007); OHIO. REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.16 (2008); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § ll-
1122(a) (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-25-430 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-43-6.1 
(2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-5ll(a)(2) (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 16 § 1752 (2007); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-307(A) (2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.23(3) (2007); WYO. STAT. 
ANN.§ 21-7-llO(a) (2007). 
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that actually define what constitutes such behavior.29 Alaska is 
one of the few jurisdictions that has actually defined immoral 
conduct that is a basis for teacher dismissal. In Alaska, such 
conduct is defined as the "commission of an act which, under 
the laws of the state, constitutes a crime involving moral 
turpitude."30 Similarly, Louisiana's statute on removal of 
teachers for immoral conduct limits its definition of immorality 
to "conviction of a felony offense affecting the public morals" as 
enumerated under Louisiana law. 31 For the most part, 
however, statutory provisions governing morality for secondary 
school teachers are usually broad or undefined. 32 In fact , some 
states have left the definition of immorality to the discretion of 
the school board (if such definition is warranted by the facts 
and has a reasonable legal basis) .33 
B. Statutory Provisions Governing Morality for Postsecondary 
School Teachers 
In general, colleges and universities regulate the 
employment of their faculty through tenure policies and 
procedures. 34 In most public institutions of higher learning, 
tenure is governed by statute; in most private postsecondary 
educational institutions, tenure is regulated by contract. 35 
Once tenure is created, it is "implemented by institutional 
regulations."36 For example, Chapter VI, Section 602 of the 
29. See, e.g. , WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 21-7-110(a). 
30. ALAS KA STAT.§ 14.20.170(A)(2) (2008) . 
81. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:443(C). 
32. See e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-940(a)(4); HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-609; 105 
ILL. COMl'. STAT. ANN. 5/10-22.4; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 156.132(1); MD. CODE AN:-!. § 6-
202(a)(1)(i) ; NER. REV. STAT. § 79-827(1)(h) (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-325(e)(1)(b); 
OHIO. REV. CODE ANN.§ 3319.16; TENN. COD E ANN.§ 49-5-501(:3)(A) (2008); VA. CODE 
ANN.§ 22.1- :l07(A); WI S. STAT. ANN.§ 118.23(3). 
33. See, e.g., Ricci v. Davis, 627 P.2d 1111, 1118- 19 (Colo. 191l l) (construing the 
statutory predecessor of COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-63-301 (2007) and stating that "i n view 
of the variousness of human behavior, 'it would be folly to suggest that . . . . 
' fl]mmorality' rendering one unfit to teach is a standard so clear as to leave no leeway 
in determining whether t he facts of a particular case meet that standard' ... . A school 
board's application of the standard to a specific instance of teacher conduct will 
therefore be sustained by a reviewing court if it is warranted in the record and has a 
reasonable basis in law") (quoting Blair v. Lovett, 582 P.2d 668, 672 (Colo. 1978)). 
34. See Mary Hora, Chalk Talk: The Court and Academia: Tenure Discrimination 
Claims Against Colleges and Uni versities, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 349, 350 (2001). 
35. !d. 
36. J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First 
Amendment ", 99 YALE L.,J. 251, 265 (1989). 
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University of North Carolina Code of the Board of Governors37 
governs academic tenure for the University of North Carolina 
system, which is comprised of sixteen constituent 
institutions. 38 According to the academic tenure policy, each 
constituent institution prescribes the procedures "by which 
decisions concerning appointment, reappointment, promotion, 
and the conferral of permanent tenure shall be made."39 
An award of tenure is given to a professor after he or she 
has completed a set period of employment and met certain 
criteria.40 Throughout this time of employment service, "the 
university has the opportunity to assess the professor's 
competence."41 Specifically, the university, in its deliberation 
on tenure, will often consider "[l]ength of service (commonly six 
years), teaching ability, research productivity, collegiality, and 
service to the university and community."42 The award of 
tenure is a grant of an important property right; 43 after a 
faculty member has been awarded tenure, he or she may only 
be dismissed for sufficient cause, financial exigency, or an 
unavoidable change in university programs.44 
The University of North Carolina's provisions governing 
37. Chapter VI, § 602 of the University of North Carolina Code of the Board of 
Governors (2004) , available at 
http://www. northcarolina .edu/con tent. php/policies/CHAPTER_ VI_ only_ web. htm#Sectio 
n602 (last visited Oct. 18, 2008) [hereinafter UNC Code]. 
38. See Constituent Universities of The University of North Carolina, available at 
http://www.northcarolina.edu/ 
content.php/campus/campusmap.htm (last visited May 3, 2008). The sixteen 
constituent schools in the University of North Carolina system are: Appalachian State 
University, East Carolina University, Elizabeth City State University, Fayetteville 
State University, North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University, North 
Carolina Central University, North Carolina School of the Arts, North Carolina State 
University at Raleigh, The University of North Carolina at Asheville, The University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina at Charlotte, The 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro, The University of North Carolina at 
Wilmington, The University of North Carolina at Pembroke, Western Carolina 
University, and Winston-Salem State University. 
39. UNC Code, supra note 37. 
40. Daniel E. Hall, The First Amendment Threat to Academic Tenure, 10 U. FLA. 
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 85, 88 (1998); Hora, supra note 34, at 350; see, e.g., ARK. CODE A~N. 
§ 6-63-104 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 49-8-301 (2008). 
41. Hora, supra note 34, at 350. 
42. Hall, supra note 40, at 88. 
43. See, e.g., Gray v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 150 F .3d 1347, 
1352- 53 (11th Cir. 1998) (outlining the distinction between the grant of tenure as a 
property right entitled to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
untenured status as lacking the creation of a protected property interest). 
44. Hall , supra note 40, at 88. 
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academic tenure provide that: 
A faculty member, who is the beneficiary of institutional 
guarantees of tenure, shall enjoy protection against unjust 
and arbitrary application of disciplinary penalties. During the 
period of such guarantees, the faculty member may be 
discharged or suspended from employment or diminished in 
rank only for reasons of incompetence, neglect of duty, or 
misconduct of such a nature as to indicate that the individual 
is unfit to continue as a member of the faculty. 45 
75 
In essence, the policies of the University of North Carolina 
allow for the possibility of the discharge or suspension of a 
tenured professor for immoral conduct, if such conduct is "of 
such a nature as to indicate that the individual is unfit to 
continue as a member of the faculty."46 North Carolina is not 
the only state that allows for the possibility of immorality 
constituting sufficient grounds for terminating or suspending 
tenured, public university professors. Other states, like 
California, have tenure policies for their public, postsecondary 
institutions that embrace immorality as a basis for terminating 
or dismissing tenured employees.47 
Akin to the use of the term immorality in statutes 
governing secondary schools, the definition of immorality is not 
always clear in postsecondary school statutes or policies 
either.48 Therefore, the application of this standard has often 
been left to the judicial system. Courts have upheld immorality 
as grounds for dismissal in cases of "dishonesty, sexual 
harassment and extreme vulgarity."49 For example, in Korf v. 
Ball State University, 50 a tenured professor was terminated 
based on ultimate findings that he made sexual advances 
toward his students that resulted in some accusations of sexual 
harassment. 51 The allegations of sexual harassment included 
claims that the professor had made unwelcome sexual 
45 . UNC Code, supra note 37, at § 603(1) (emphasis added). 
46. Id. 
47. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE A NN. § 87732(a) (2007) (providing that tenured 
community college employees may be dismissed for immoral or unprofessional 
conduct); CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 89535(a) (2007) (providing that tenured California 
State University employees may be dismissed for immoral conduct). 
48. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 87732(a); CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 
89535(a) . 
49. See McGee, supra note 25, at 596. 
50. 726 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1984). 
51. !d. at 1224-25. 
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overtures and offered students good grades in exchange for 
sexual acts. 52 After his termination, the tenured professor 
brought suit against the university, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, claiming that the termination of his employment violated 
his "constitutional rights to substantive and procedural due 
process, equal protection, free speech, freedom of association, 
and privacy."53 The federal district court granted the 
defendants' summary judgment motion, based on the Eleventh 
Amendment and qualified immunity. 54 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit addressed the substantive 
merits of the plaintiffs claims; affirmed the district court's 
decision; and ultimately upheld the professor's dismissal, 
finding that the tenured professor was discharged from his 
employment for engaging in the unethical conduct of exploiting 
students for his private advantage, which qualified as 
proscribed conduct by the Faculty Handbook. 55 Further, the 
court determined that the university's action in dismissing the 
teacher was "rationally related to its responsibility to establish 
and maintain high ethical standards within the University in 
order to maintain a proper academic environment."56 
In the Korf case, the judicial system provided the contours 
of a definition for immoral or unethical conduct that could 
provide a sufficient basis for termination of a tenured 
postsecondary educator. However, overall, judicial 
interpretations of the statutory provisions governing educator 
morality have provided a less than consistent approach on the 
definition of immoral conduct. 
C. The Legal Standard Applied for Statutory Provisions 
Governing Educator Morality 
Most jurisdictions require that, in order for statutory 
morals clauses to be enforced against secondary and 
postsecondary school educators as a basis for termination, 
there must be a "nexus" between the challenged conduct of the 
teacher and the t eacher's duties. 57 Some courts have referred to 
52. ld. at 1224. 
53. Id. at 1225. 
54. I d. 
55. Id. at 1 227~30. 
56. ld. at 1229. 
57. See. e.g., Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ .. 461 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1969). However. 
not all jurisdictions apply this nexus test , as will be outlined towards the end of thi s 
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the nexus required to justify a school's decision of taking 
adverse action against an educator for immorality as a 
"rational nexus,"58 a "sufficient nexus,"59 or a "substantial 
nexus."60 Regardless of the classification used, most courts will 
not uphold the discipline or dismissal of a teacher for 
immorality unless the alleged immoral conduct has a relation 
to or affects the teacher's work. 61 
The California case of Morrison u. State Board of Education 
serves as substantial precedent for these types of findings. 62 In 
Morrison, the California Supreme Court reversed and 
remanded a lower court decision affirming a school board's 
decision to revoke a teacher's license on the ground of immoral 
and unprofessional conduct and acts of moral turpitude after a 
male public school teacher became involved for one week in a 
physical (but non-criminal) homosexual relationship with 
another teacher in the public school system.63 The court 
determined that the Board of Education could not characterize 
the conduct in the case as "immoral," "unprofessional," or 
"involving moral turpitude within the meaning of [the state's 
education code,] unless that conduct indicate[d] that the 
[teacher was] unfit to teach."64 
The criteria that the Morrison court used in determining 
whether the teacher's conduct had a "nexus" to his duties were: 
(1) the likelihood that the conduct may have adversely affected 
section. 
58. Golden v. Bd. of Educ. of County of Harrison, 285 S.E.2d 665, 668 \W.Va. 
198 1) (finding that a school board 's dismissal of a high school guidance counselor for 
felony s hoplifting, pursuant to a state statute that allowed for dismissal for immorality, 
was improper because there was no proof of a "rational nexus" between the conduct and 
her duties); see also Rogliano v. Fayette County Bd. of Educ. , 347 S.E.2d 220, 224 
(W.Va. 1986). 
59. Lite v. Hancock Place Sch. Dist., 701 S.W.2d 500, 506 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) 
(finding a "sufficient nexus" between sexual abuse engaged in by a fourth-grade 
teacher and his responsibilities as a teacher such that his termination was justified 
under an immorality state statute). 
60. Rado v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Naugatuck, 583 A.2d 102, 108 (Conn. 1990) 
(finding a "substantial nexus" between a high school teacher's intentional tampering 
with the school telephone system and his duties at the school, which sufficiently 
established termination grounds). 
61. See, e.g. , Rogliano, 347 S .E.2d at 225 (reversing the dismissal of a permanent 
substitute teacher for immoral conduct based on a misdemeanor charge for possession 
of a small amount of marijuana in his home as there was an insufficient nexus between 
this conduct and his occupational responsibilities). 
62. 461 P.2d at 375. 
63. /d. at :377-78. 
64. ld. at 386 (internal quota tions omitted). 
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students or fellow teachers; (2) the degree of such adversity 
anticipated; (3) the proximity or remoteness in time of the 
conduct; ( 4) the type of teaching certificate held by the party 
involved; (5) the extenuating or aggravating circumstances, if 
any, surrounding the conduct; (6) the praiseworthiness or 
blameworthiness of the motives resulting in the conduct; (7) 
the likelihood of the recurrence of the questioned conduct; and 
(8) the extent to which disciplinary action may inflict an 
adverse impact or chilling effect upon the constitutional rights 
of the teacher involved or other teachers.65 Notably, these oft-
cited Morrison criteria, which can be used to determine 
whether a "nexus" exists, are not based exclusively on a 
teacher's classroom proficiency.66 
Although many jurisdictions utilize the Morrison factors in 
their determinations of nexus requirements,67 not all 
jurisdictions require that an applied "nexus" exist between the 
allegedly immoral behavior of the teacher and his or her ability 
to perform the job.68 Oftentimes, this lack of an explicit nexus 
requirement is justified by a finding of an implicit connection 
between the severity of the conduct at issue and the educator's 
lack of fitness to teach. 69 For example, in Denton v. South 
Kitsap School District, the school board discharged a teacher 
who had sexual relations with a student resulting in the 
student becoming pregnant and the teacher subsequently 
marrying the student. 70 The Denton Court explained that it 
declined to set a requirement of showing an adverse effect upon 
the "fitness to teach" by the alleged conduct "where the sexual 
misconduct complained of directly involves a teacher and a 
minor student."71 
A review of the statutory provisions regarding the morality 
of secondary and postsecondary educators (and the cases that 
construe such provisions) demonstrates the variety of 
approaches that states and courts have taken in regulating 
65. ld. at 386. 
66. See id. 
67. See, e.g., Briggs v. Bd. of Dirs. of Hinton Cmty. Sch. Dist., 282 N.W.2d 740, 
742-43 (Iowa 1979); Fisher v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 622, 357 N.W.2d 152, 155-56 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984). 
68. See e.g., Hainline v. Bond, 824 P.2d 959 (Kan. 1992); Denton v. S. Kitsap Sch. 
Dist., 516 P.2d 1080 (Wa. Ct. App. 1973). 
69. Denton, 516 P.2d at 1080. 
70. ld. at 1081. 
71. ld. at 1082. 
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educator conduct. Because jurisdictions have not been 
completely consistent in their implementation and application 
of these statutes, many schools (both public and private, 
secondary and postsecondary) are choosing to use employment 
contracts as another basis for enforcing educator morality. 
IV. APPLICATIONS OF CONTRACTUAL MORALS CLAUSES FOR 
SECONDARY SCHOOL EDUCATORS 
Teachers and other secondary school authorities stand in 
loco parentis, and thus they bear "the responsibility of the duty 
to protect students.'>72 The conditions in which educators are 
deemed to be in loco parentis depend, in part, on the nature of 
the secondary school and on the educational activity at issue.73 
"When parents place minor children in private schools for their 
education, the teachers and administrators of those schools 
stand in loco parentis over the children entrusted to them."74 
Generally, public secondary schools do not "have such a degree 
of control over children as to give rise to a constitutional 'duty 
to protect"';75 however, "for many purposes, 'school authorities 
act in loco parentis' ... with the power and indeed the duty to 
'inculcate the habits and manners of civility."'76 
In light of this in loco parentis responsibility, many 
secondary schools (both public and private)77 are instituting 
safeguards for students through a contractual morals clause 
requirement as a condition of teacher employment and 
retention. 78 The inclusion of these types of clauses m 
72. Todd A. DeMitchell, The Duty to Protect: Blackstone's Doctrine of In Loco 
Pa:centis: A Lens for Viewing the Sexual Abuse of Students, 2002 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 17, 
26 (2002). In loco parentis is defined as standing "in the place of a parent." See BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 803 (8th ed. 2004). 
73. See, e.g., Anne·Marie Harris & Kenneth B. Grooms, A New Lesson Plan for 
Educational Institutions: Expanded Rules Governing Liability Under Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972 for Student and Faculty Sexual Harassment , 8 AM. U. 
J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 575, 619 (2000). 
74. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995). 
75. Id. at 655 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 489 
u.s. 189, 200 (1989)). 
76. Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681, 684 
(1986)). 
77. Examples of such contractual morals clauses can be found in both the public 
and private secondary school context. However, recent media coverage of such clauses 
demonstrates that these types of contractual clauses tend to be more prevalent in 
private schools. 
78. See, e.g., Smulevitz, supra note 4, at B3 (describing how it is standard practice 
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educational contracts has resulted from both internal79 and 
external80 calls for reform. Oftentimes, these employment 
conditions are supplementary to or reflective of the governing 
state's statutory scheme or a state administrative agency's 
regulatory structure that imposes certain implied morals 
requirements on all secondary school teachers. 81 
As a result of this institution of morals clauses as a 
condition for employment and retention, many secondary 
school teachers have been discharged or disciplined for conduct 
that has taken place both on and off school grounds. 82 The 
enforcement of these contractual morals clauses often mirrors 
how school systems have enforced statutory morality 
requirements for employment. 83 As such, it is important to 
for all educational contracts in an Indiana school district to contain morals clauses); 
but see Sandi Switzer, Residents Petition for Firing of Danby Principal, RUTLAND 
HERALD (VT), Nov. 16, 2005 (stating that no educational contracts in the state of 
Vermont contain morals clauses). 
79. See, e.g., Tustin Amole, Academy Board Agrees to Amend Morals Clause -
Intent Wasn't to Follow Teachers into the Bedroom, Chairman Says, ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
NEWS (Colorado), Apr. 12, 1995, at 13A (explaining a charter school board's decision to 
amend a contractual morals clause that defined immorality as "evidence of sexual 
behavior outside of holy wedlock or legal matrimony; or felonious conduct."); see also 
Mede Nix, Rojas Suggests Morals Clause in Contract, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGIL\M, 
May 4, 1999, at 4 (outlining how a Dallas school superintendent finalist, Bill Rojas, 
with two past DWI arrests, suggested the insertion of an alcohol-related morals clause 
into his contract if hired); Linda K. Wertheimer, DISD Board Hires Rojas as 
Superintendent, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 26, 1999, at 1A (describing how the self-
suggested morals clause was inserted into the contract upon Rojas' hiring as Dallas 
Schools' Superintendent). 
80. See, e.g., Renate Robey, Ouster Bid Splits School-Eaglecrest Principal 
Assailed Over Affair, THE DENVER POST, Apr. 24, 1991, at 1B (stating that parents 
"suggested that a 'morals' clause be added to [a school] district's personnel policies" 
after the revelation of an extra-marital affair between a high school principal and 
music teacher). 
81. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-325 (e)(1)(b) (providing that "[n]o career 
employee shall be dismissed or demoted or employed on a part-time basis except for 
one or more of the following ... immorality."); Morrison, 461 P.2d at 377 (construing 
California's state educational code in a determination of whether a teacher's 
engagement in a homosexual relationship constituted moral turpitude). 
82. See, e.g., Joe Sylvester & Ed Fletcher, Critics, Friends See Jerrytone as Man of 
Many Faces - The Local Teacher Faces Court Action on Drug-Related and Sex 
Harassment Charges, TIMES LEADER (Wilkes Barre, PA), May 28, 2000, at 1A 
(discussing how a secondary school teacher's contractual morals clause might be 
implicated if he were to be convicted of allowing controlled substances in the classroom 
and sexual harassment); Rod Thomson, Popular Coach Broke His Contract, as an 
Employee and as a Role Model, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE (Fla.), May 31, 2002, at 
BSl (describing how a physical education teacher and coach was fired from his position 
at a Catholic school after fathering a child out of wedlock pursuant to a contractual 
morals clause). 
83. John Trebilcock, Comment, Off Campus: School Board Control Over Teacher 
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briefly summarize the most prevalent cases in which educators 
have lost secondary school employment for statutory 
"immorality" or "moral turpitude."84 There have been a 
multitude of cases in which courts have found conviction of 
criminal activity to be a sufficient trigger for the dismissal or 
sanction of teachers under state statutory schemes. 85 Arrests 
for criminal activity have also provided the impetus for 
disciplinary conduct under state statutes. 86 Furthermore, 
certain sexual activity has constituted a reason for the 
discipline or firing of secondary school teachers per immorality 
statutes.87 Other schools have justified dismissal decisions 
based on dishonest conduct engaged in by secondary school 
teachers.s8 
As pr'eviously explained, although many courts-in order to 
uphold a dismissal based on statutory immorality or moral 
turpitude-require a rational nexus89 between the allegedly 
immoral activity at issue and the teacher's performance in the 
Conduct, 35 TULSA L.J. 445, 453-60 (2000). 
84. 70 OKL. STAT. § 6-101.22(A)(7). 
85. See, e.g., Kenai Peninsula Borough Bd. of Educ. v. Brown, 691 P.2d 1034, 1041 
(Alaska 1984) (upholding the substantive determination of the school board that the 
conviction of a high school teacher of diversion of electricity constituted a crime of 
moral turpitude, which served as the basis for the teacher's dismissal); McCullough v. 
Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 562 N.E.2d 1233, 1238 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (affirming the 
dismissal of a teacher based on multiple criminal convictions for failure to pay taxes); 
Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Payne, 430 N.E.2d 310, 317 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (affirming the 
dismissal of secondary school teacher who pled guilty to misdemeanor possession of 
marijuana) ; but see Hoagla nd v. Mount Vernon Sch. Dist. , 623 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Wash. 
1981) (remanding for evidentiary hearing a dismissal of a secondary school teacher 
based on a conviction for grand larceny through the purchase of a stolen motorcycle). 
86. See, e.g., Dan McFeely, Principal Will Respond to Theft Charge Today, 
TNDJANAPOLJ S STAR, Mar. 20, 2000, at B1 (describing how a secondary school educator 
was placed on administrative leave after being arrested for shoplifting curtains); Paul 
Riede & Edwin Acevedo, Baldwinsville School Chief Resigns, POST-STANDARD 
(Syracuse, NY), Aug. 6, 2002, at A1(stating that school superintendent resigned after 
arrest for public lewdness despite the lack of a morals clause in his contract). 
87. See, e.g., Toney v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch . Dist. Bd. of Educ. , 881 
P.2d. 1112, 1116 (Alaska 1994) (affirming the dismissal of a teacher for statutory 
immoral conduct where the teacher had engaged in a sexual relationship with a minor 
in another state prior to his employment, which constituted a crime in both Alaska and 
in the other state); In Re Etienne, 460 N. W.2d 109, 113 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) 
(affirming a school board's decision to discharge a secondary school teacher based on 
allegations of sexual activity with a student). 
88. See, e.g., Swinderman v. Dover City Sch . Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 91AP110092, 
1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 2187, at *8-10 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 20, 1992) (affirming school 
hoard's termination decision of secondat·y school teacher based on falsification of sick 
le.ave). 
89. Stelzer v. State Bd. of Educ. , 595 N.E.2d 489, 492 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991). 
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school, 90 such a showing of a nexus is not a requirement in all 
states or courts.91 Because various court decisions potentially 
require a showing of a nexus requirement, arguably such a 
requirement might also be imposed upon any school system 
that seeks or has sought to terminate an employee pursuant to 
a contractual morals clause. However, the expansive principles 
of freedom of contract, which generally allow "parties [to] 
contract as they wish," 92 which "courts will enforce ... without 
passing on their substance,"93 and which are "rooted in the 
notion that it is in the public interest to recognize that 
individuals have broad powers to order their own affairs," 94 
provide a strong argument in the alternative. An examination 
of how secondary schools are actually utilizing contractual 
morals clauses as conditions of initial and continued 
employment of teachers illustrates that most of these cases fall 
on the side of broad freedom of contract rather than on the side 
of a process nexus requirement. 
Secondary schools have sought dismissal or discipline of 
educators, pursuant to contractual morals clauses, for a broad 
range of "immoral" conduct. The breadth of the conduct, which 
is regulated by contractual morals clauses that are used as 
conditions for employment for secondary school instructors, has 
led to employment disputes.95 Some conduct would likely 
90. See, e.g., Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 377, 386-87 (Cal. 
1969). 
91. See, e.g., Stelzer, 595 N.E.2d at 492 (stating that the Morrison nexus 
requirement has not been adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court in interpreting the 
state's educational dismissal immorality statute); but see Freisthler v. State Bd. of 
Educ., No. 1-02-36, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 4975, at *14-15 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 20, 
2002) (finding that "implicit in the wording 'conduct that is unbecoming to the person's 
profession,' ... is a requirement that the conduct in some way affect the individual's 
ability to teach. To decide what constitutes conduct unbecoming a teacher without any 
regard to teaching, is to base the decision solely on the Board's determination of what 
is unacceptable behavior and 'such a statute, unless narrowed by clear and well-known 
standards, affords too great a potential for arbitrary and discriminatory application 
and administration"' (quoting Morrison, 461 P.2d at 383, n.15). 
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, introductory cmt. (1981). 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. See Lawrence Goodman, Archdiocese Hit on Morals Clause in Teacher Pact, 
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, Sept. 9, 1996, at 25 (detailing a protest of a secondary school 
teachers' union of the Archdiocese of New York's attempt to insert a morals clause into 
employment contracts that would give it the right to fire teachers if "they violated 
official Catholic dogma in their private lives"); see also .John McGourty, Teachers Pichet 
in Bristol, TIMES (Trenton, N.J.), Sept. 5, 1997, at A2 (discussing how a rewording of a 
contractual morals clause in private high school teachers contracts was one issue of a 
labor dispute between a teachers' union and the Camden Diocese). 
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qualify, without argument, as a violation of morality clauses. 
However, in many other instances, secondary schools have 
exercised such expansive authority in their determinations of 
what could be considered breaches of contractual morals 
clauses that arguments could be made that such dismissals 
constitute breaches of contract on the part of the school 
systems. For example, a private high school art and religion 
instructor, "who pose[d] nude for figure drawing studies in a 
private Toledo studio, [was] asked by school officials to resign 
because they sa[id] he [was] violating a morals clause in his 
contract."96 Such an operation of a contractual morals clause 
might be the basis for litigation; however, given the American 
judicial system's reliance on the key principle of freedom of 
contract and the fact that the school in question was a private 
school, such litigation might be quickly dismissed. 
Other conduct that has been the basis for termination of 
secondary employment poses some similarly problematic 
aspects. Several secondary educators have faced dismissal from 
their private school positions as a result of parenting children 
out of wedlock. 97 One such educator was offered a new position 
as a coach and social studies teacher at a nearby public high 
school within two months of his firing, highlighting the 
potential differences between the exercise and construction of 
contractual morals clauses by a private secondary school versus 
that of a public secondary school.98 
Interestingly, some secondary schools have extended the 
limit of morals clauses to apply, not only to the educator, but to 
the students for whom the educator has responsibility. One 
such example took place when a public high school principal 
allegedly demanded that a football coach and teacher sign a 
contract that contained a morals clause with respect to the 
conduct of football players (both on and off campus), which 
would allow for the coach's discipline if any of his eighty-five 
football players engaged in misconduct. 99 Rather than agree to 
96. Art Teacher's Ouster Sought on Moral Grounds, JOURNA L GAZETTE (Fort 
Wayne , Ind.). June 13, 1996, at lC . 
97. See, e.g., Roland, supra note 6, at Al; Dan Ventura, Daddy's Got a New dab, 
Baby - Norton Welcomes Coach Fired as Unwed Father , THE BOSTON HERALD, May 27, 
2006, a t 6. 
98. See Ventura, su.pra note 97, a t 6. 
99 . See Brian McCready, Gridders at Foran Push for Coach's Return, NEW HAVEN 
REmsn:R (Conn.) , Apr. 1:3, 2002, at B2. 
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such a contractual requirement, the coach quit his position. 100 
Although the coach then immediately reapplied for his position 
with overwhelming community support, another individual was 
hired as his replacement. 101 It seems that this type of morals 
clause may constitute the outermost bounds with respect to the 
use of these contractual clauses as conditions for employment 
in a secondary school context. 
However, a recent case of morals clauses and secondary 
school employment seemingly pushes these limits even further. 
A Wisconsin French teacher, Kelly Romenesko, was fired from 
her position at a private, Catholic secondary school in 2004 due 
to an alleged violation of her contractual morals clause; the 
claimed violation was that Romenesko had "undergone in vitro 
fertilization, a procedure the [Catholic] church opposes." 102 
Romenesko filed suit against the school system, claiming that 
the system had violated the state Fair Employment Act by 
discriminating against her on the basis of sex, because she was 
pregnant. 103 In January 2007, "an administrative law judge 
found probable cause that [the school system] discriminated 
against Romenesko because she was pregnant." 104 After 
negotiations between the parties floundered, 105 a three-day 
hearing was scheduled before an administrative law judge of 
the state Department of Workforce Development. 106 However, 
before the hearing began and before a decision on the merits 
was made, Romenesko settled with the school system. 107 So, 
whether or not this type of enforcement of a contractual morals 
clause would be upheld by a court will have to be determined in 
another case. 
A review of the use of contractual morals clauses as a basis 
100. See Brian McCready, Foran Coach Who Quit Wants to Return to ,Job; Charges 
School Principal Forced Him from Post, NEW HAVEN REGISTER (Conn.), Apr. 12, 2002, 
at C6. 
101. See Manuela Da Costa-Fernandes, Beler Loses Bid for Coaching .Job, NF:W 
HAVEN REGIST!m (Conn.), May 17, 2002, at Bl. 
102. Susan Squires, Former ACES Teacher Wins In Vitro Probable-Cause Ruling, 
POST-CRESCENT (Appleton, Wis.), Feb. 22, 2007, at 1A. 
103. See id. 
104. ,J.E. Espino, Talks Fail in In Vitro Case, POST-CRESCENT (Appleton, Wis.), 
Mar. 6, 2007, at 1C. 
105. See id. 
106. See Appleton Teacher Who Had In Vitro Gets Hearing, CAPITAL TIMES 
(Madison, Wis.), June 4, 2007, at Bl. 
107. See Susan Squires, Romenesko Relieved That Ordeal is Over, POST-CRESCENT 
(Appleton, Wis.), Aug. 29, 2007, at 2A. 
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for termination of secondary school educators demonstrates 
that the morals clause serves as another device to be used by a 
school system when an adverse employment decision must be 
made. The inclusion of morals clauses within education 
contracts bolsters the power that many secondary schools 
already have, pursuant to a state statutory scheme, when an 
educator engages in immoral conduct. However, the extent of 
enforcement of these types of contractual clauses may prove to 
be the source of future litigation in the secondary educational 
context. 
V. APPLICATIONS OF CONTRACTUAL MORALS FOR 
POSTSECONDARY SCHOOL EDUCATORS 
Just as in the secondary school context, contractual morals 
clauses are increasingly becoming used as a condition of 
employment for postsecondary educators. 108 Also akin to the 
morality requirements for secondary school instructors, 
postsecondary school employees' dismissals based on 
contractual morals provisions often echo dismissals based on 
statutory definitions of immorality. 109 The problematic nature 
of these statutory definitions for secondary school teachers 
equally apply to postsecondary schoolteachers. Essentially, 
immorality has been a "justifiable reason for firing a tenured 
professor, but what constitutes immorality is not always 
clear." 110 So, a concise review of cases in which university and 
college educators have been discharged pursuant to state 
statute is merited. 
Postsecondary institutions have determined that criminal 
convictions qualify as immoral conduct to justify dismissal of 
108. See, e.fL .Jim Leggett, LC Policy Encourages Alcohol Abstinence, ALEXANDRJA 
DAILY TOWN TALK (La.), Apr. 13, 2006, at l -3A (describing how the contracts for 
Louisiana College, a private , Baptist college, would contain a new clause stating that 
employees a re "expected to abstain from serving, using or advocating the use of 
alcoholic beverages in public and/or in settings in which students are or are likely to be 
present excP.pt in the case of communion"). 
109. See, e.g., Copeland & Murry, supra note 24 at 233. 
llO . McGee, su.pra note 2fi, at 596 (stating that "courts have upheld dishonesty, 
sexual harassment and extreme vulgarity a s valid grounds for dismissal [of tenured 
professors]," but that "other courts have struck down immora lity as grounds for 
di smissal because 'immorality means different things to different people, and its 
definition depends on the idiosyncrasies of the individual school hoard members'" and 
because ·'the potential tor arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is inherent in such 
a statute'') . 
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educators under state statutory schemes. 111 There also have 
been instances in which universities have sought the dismissal 
of professors based upon somewhat ambiguous claims of 
violation of "trust," rather than on direct claims tied to criminal 
convictions. 112 Further, like secondary educational cases, 
certain sexual activity has served as a basis for the termination 
of employment of postsecondary educators. 113 Additionally, 
plagiarism and dishonest conduct have been interpreted to 
meet statutory immorality requirements in the dismissal of 
postsecondary educators. 114 
Interestingly, some courts have made specific distinctions 
with respect to conduct that could constitute a valid basis for 
dismissal at the secondary level, but not at the postsecondary 
level. In Texton v. Hancock, 115 a tenured instructor was 
discharged from a junior college for "immorality, misconduct in 
office and willful neglect of duty." 116 Specifically, findings were 
made that the instructor "discussed the personal problems and 
grades of students with other members of the class; advised her 
students to overrule another teacher; used profanity in the 
presence of a student; [and] made general statements ... that 
all men are inadequate." 117 Additionally, findings were made 
that: 
Texton requested that a student have an affair with her ex-
husband; that she gave a class party and was seen there 
drinking a beer; that she visited the home of a student after 
midnight, bringing along her husband and two other men and 
carrying beer; [and] that she 'passed out' in the student's 
111. ld. 
112. See, e.g., Joseph Kirby & V. Dian Haynes, Teachers Find Public Eye Doesn't 
Blinh - Educators Say They're Held to Higher Standard, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Feb. 28, 
1992, at 1 (outlining how the Provost of Northwestern University sought the dismissal 
of a tenured professor after said professor pled guilty to a felony embezzlement 
conviction for cashing Social Security checks for his deceased mother, not because of 
the admission to the felony, but beca use the professor "breached the faculty-student 
trust"). 
11 :3. See, e.g., Lehmann v. Bd. of Trustees, 576 P.2d :397, :399 (Wash. 1978) 
(affirming the dismissal of a tenured faculty member at a private college for sexual 
misconduct). 
114. See, e.g., Yu v. Peterson, 13 F.3d 1413, 1417 (lOth Cir. 1993) (affirming the 
dismissal of a tenured professor for plagiarism); Jawa v. Fayetteville State Univ., 426 
F. Supp. 218 (E.D.N.C. 1976) (affirming the dismissal of a tenured faculty member at a 
public university for engaging in dishonest conduct with his superiors). 
115. 359 So. 2d 895 (Fla . Ct. App. 1978). 
116. Id. at 896. 
117. Id. 
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living room after drinking beer. 118 
Because of these findings, the College Board of Trustees 
discharged Texton; this discharge was sustained by the state 
Department of Education. 119 Texton appealed and the Court of 
Appeal of Florida ordered the reversal of the discharge. In its 
decision of reversal, the court specifically stated: 
If a school teacher is responsible for teaching students in their 
formative years and commits acts of immorality after school 
hours, such acts may be indirectly related to misconduct in 
office .... Here Ms. Texton's conduct must be judged in the 
context of her more liberal, open, robust college surroundings. 
She is not teaching children of tender years in an elementary 
school. Her acts have little or no connection whatsoever with 
morality, misconduct in office or willful neglect particularly 
when considering that the complainants were junior college 
students, many of them older and working full-time , 
attending classes part-time or at night. 120 
While courts, like the Texton court, have stated limits to the 
imposition of morality statutory requirements as conditions of 
employment for postsecondary instructors, scenarios that 
involve contractual morals clauses as conditions of similar 
employment tend to have much more extensive reach. With 
respect to the use of contractual morals clauses as a basis for 
termination or discipline of postsecondary educators, the 
triggering conduct can be much broader than the conduct that 
is at issue in a statutory dismissal. For example, allegations of 
criminal activity, even if ultimately found to be without merit 
by a court, may be a sufficient basis for dismissal pursuant to a 
contractual morals clause. 121 Allegations of academic fraud 
may also suffice for the operation of a contractual morals 
clause and the termination of postsecondary educators. 122 
While this type of conduct may lead to a valid termination 
118. fd. 
119. ld. 
120. !d. at 897. 
121. See Andrew Miller, Citadel, Taaffe Settle Lawsuit , POST AND COURIER 
(Charleston, S.C.), May 7, 1997, at Cl (describing how the Citadel fired the football 
head coach for a violation of his morals clause rela ted to two DUI cha rges, of which the 
coach was eventually acquitted, how the coach brought a breach of contract suit 
following his termination, and how the lawsuit was eventually settled). 
122. See, e.g., Report: Minn. Staff Ji'abricated Grades, PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, 
Apr. 15, 1999, at 85 (discussing how allegations of faculty awarding false grades to 
college athletes were being investigated by outside law firms and implying that 
disciplinary action could result based on said allegations). 
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of an employment contract in a postsecondary setting, the 
dearth of case law on this precise subject matter should urge 
caution for postsecondary institutions that wish to utilize 
morals clauses as conditions for employment. Unlike the 
secondary school examples of terminations based on morals 
clause violations, the postsecondary educational context lacks a 
substantial amount of precedent in this field. It appears, 
however, that as more universities and colleges adopt morals 
clauses as contractual requirements, the body of case law will 
concomitantly expand as well. Further, the constitutional 
limitations of these moral requirements will cabin the powers 
of secondary and postsecondary administrators. 
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF REQUIRING MORALS 
CLAUSES FOR SECONDARY AND POSTSECONDARY EDUCATORS 
As demonstrated, ambiguity and uncertainty as to the 
validity of a school's actions of terminating or disciplining a 
teacher for moral misconduct may arise whether such action is 
based on statutory or contractual provisions. This ambiguity 
can become especially pointed when the school's action poses 
an alleged conflict between the teacher's work life and her 
personal life. 123 Additionally, a multitude of questions are 
raised by requiring teachers to comply with morality clauses, 
which include: (1) what conduct constitutes immoral behavior, 
and who makes the judgment call as to whether the teacher's 
behavior is considered immoral?; (2) how far can a school delve 
into the personal lives of teachers in order to actually enforce 
these morals clauses?; and (3) is there a realm of privacy that a 
teacher in fact has, where his or her conduct should not 
constitute "immoral behavior"? These questions demonstrate 
the fact that enforcing morals clauses against teachers carries 
a potential of infringing upon their constitutional rights. 
Despite their position and influence as role models, 
teachers "are not relegated to a watered-down version of 
constitutional rights." 124 They maintain the constitutional 
123. See, e.g., Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 513 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1973) (upholding the 
revocation of an elementary school teacher's license based on her sexual activity in a 
"swingers club" outside of work, and that did not involve any students). It is important 
to note that, though the court does reason into the conflict between the teacher's work 
life and her personal life, the court also faces a situation where the teacher's sexual 
activity was allegedly illegal. Id. at 890-92. 
124. Garrity v. New J ersey, 385 U.S. 49 3, 500 (1967). 
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rights available to all individuals. Clearly, these constitutional 
rights are available to educators in public institutions. 125 In 
order for teachers employed by private schools to demonstrate 
that the private schools' actions violated their constitutional 
rights, the teachers must prove that the schools' actions 
constituted state action. 126 "Conduct that is formally 'private' 
may become so entwined with governmental policies or so 
impregnated with a governmental character as to become 
subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state 
action." 127 
This conduct is not easily determined. 128 However, private 
schools that "clearly perform functions governmental in nature, 
such as providing higher education to and exerc1smg 
substantial dominion over its students . . . may be 
constrained ... by the requirements of the Constitution." 129 
Moreover, courts have stated that "support to [private schools] 
'through any arrangement, management, funds, or property' 
would [seemingly] inject state action into [the school's] 
conduct". 130 As to the validity of constitutional claims brought 
by teachers who have willingly entered into contracts with 
terms requiring that they refrain from immoral behavior, these 
claims seem uncertain given that parties have the freedom to 
contract as they wish and courts usually enforce these 
provisions. 131 
In most cases where claims of constitutional violations 
resulting from enforcing statutory morals clauses upon 
teachers have been raised, the following rights have been 
implicated: due process, privacy, freedom of speech, freedom of 
association, and equal protection. The effect of requiring 
teacher morality on each of these constitutional rights will be 
discussed separately. 
125. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 
(1969) (stating that teachers do not "shed their constitutional rights ... at the 
schoolhouse gate"). 
126. See Buckton v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 366 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (D. 
Mass. 1973). 
127. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966). 
128. See id. ("What is 'private' action and what is 'state' action is not always easy 
to determine."). 
129. Buckton, 366 F. Supp. at 1156. 
130. See id. (quoting Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958)). 
1:31. See RESTATEMENT (SECONO) OF CONTRACTS, su.pra note 93, a t ch. 8, 
introductory cmt. 
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A. Due Process Rights 
Teachers possess important due process rights under the 
Constitution.132 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
provide that no person shall be deprived of "life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law." 133 The Supreme Court 
has interpreted this clause as containing both a substantive 
and a procedural component. 134 
1. Procedural due process 
Procedural due process challenges focus on whether the 
government has followed adequate procedures in depriving a 
person of life, liberty, or property. 135 The property interests 
required for due process consist of more than abstract needs, 
desires, or unilateral expectations of benefits or privileges. 136 
Instead, a person must have "a legitimate claim of entitlement" 
to a benefit to have a property interest in that benefit. 137 As 
such, a nontenured educator has no constitutional right, 
flowing from procedural due process, to a pre-termination 
hearing at the end of an employment contract period unless 
there is a loss of "liberty" or "property." 138 Conversely, a 
"tenured university professor has a property interest in his 
position, and thus cannot be deprived of that position without 
due process." 139 
Furthermore, courts have held that once an existing 
property or liberty right has been established, procedural due 
process requires that an educator with such a right be given 
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. 14° For 
instance, in Stovall v. Huntsville City Board of Education, even 
132. See Fulmer, supra note 24, a t 283. 
133. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
134. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) (stating that the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments' guarantees of "due process of law" includes a procedural 
component and substantive component). 
135. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Procedural Due Process Claims, 16 TOURO L. REV. 
871, 871 (2000). 
136. See Bd. of Regents of State Colis. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (finding no 
Fourteenth Amendment property interest sufficient to grant a procedural hearing 
where a university declined to renew a contract of a nontenured faculty member). 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 961 F.2d 1125, 1134 (3d Cir. 1992). 
140. Stovall v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ ., 602 So. 2d 407, 408-09 (Ala. Civ. App. 
1992). 
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an untenured teacher had a property right entitling him to 
procedural due process. 141 In Stovall, an untenured teacher 
was arrested for possession of crack cocaine, the school system 
superintendent recommended that the teacher's employment 
contract be cancelled, a hearing was held, and subsequently, 
the school system Board of Education (the "board") voted to 
affirm the cancellation of the contract. 142 As a result, the 
teacher filed a lawsuit claiming that his due process rights 
were violated. 143 The court reasoned that, although the board 
was entitled to dismiss or suspend the teacher for immorality 
under a state statute, the teacher had a one-year contract and 
had an expectation of one year's employment that constituted a 
property interest. 144 This property interest entitled the non-
tenured teacher to procedural due process. 145 However, the 
court found that the board fulfilled these procedural due 
process requirements by giving the teacher notice of the 
grounds for the proposed dismissal and of his right to a hearing 
before the board, at which he could present evidence, as well as 
an opportunity to be heard. 
Consistent with the findings of Stovall, courts hold that 
once an existing property or liberty right has been established, 
procedural due process requires that an educator with such a 
right be given adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
146 The opportunity to be heard must be provided "at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." 147 
Generally, this means that a hearing must be conducted 
before a property or liberty right is terminated. 148 A procedural 
due process challenge on this point was raised in Ashlie v. 
Chester- Upland School District, where a teacher had been 
employed by a school district prior to her sex change operation 
transforming her from a man to a woman. 149 When the teacher 
returned for the next school year as a woman, the school 
141. !d. 
142. I d. 
143. ld. at 409. 
144. I d. 
145. I d. 
146. Brown v. Bathke, 566 F.2d 588, 591 (8th Cir. 1977) (stating that a teacher's 
one-year contract created a property interest subject to procedural due process 
protections). 
147. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). 
148. See Roth , 408 U.S. at 570 n. 7. 
149. No. 78-4037, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12516, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 1979). 
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district, in compliance with Pennsylvania law, dismissed her 
for incompetency, immorality and other improper conduct that 
was potentially psychologically damaging to students, without 
a pre-dismissal hearing. 150 The court found that the state law 
allowing termination of the teacher without the benefit of a 
prior hearing was unconstitutional, and, as a result, the 
teacher's procedural due process r ights were violated. 151 The 
Ashlie court determined that the school district, not the court, 
was the appropriate entity to determine whether the teacher 
should be terminated and ordered that a hearing be held by the 
school district so that this determination could be made. 152 
Further, the court ordered, "at the minimum, reinstatement [of 
the teacher] to a suspended status with back pay pending the 
outcome of the school board hearing" as a cure for the 
procedural due process defect. 153 
In addition to the general requirements of notice and an 
opportunity to be heard, to avoid procedural due process 
challenges, statutory and contractual morals clauses for 
teachers cannot be unconstitutionally vague; that is, they 
must: (1) be sufficiently clear as to give fair warning of the 
conduct and (2) provide a standard or guide against which 
conduct can be uniformly judged by the courts and 
administrative agencies. 154 However, sta tutory provisions 
imposing morality upon teachers have been challenged as being 
unconstitutionally vague. 155 In particular, arguments have 
been made that these statutory morality clauses do not provide 
an opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited, so as to 
avoid that type of conduct. 156 In response to such arguments , 
while some courts have upheld these statutory morals clauses 
based on a determination that they are not unconstitutionally 
150. ld. at *2. 
151. l d. at *6. 
152. l d. at *9- 10. 
153. ld. at *11. 
154. See Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 387 (Cal. 1969) ("Civi l as 
well as crimin al statutes must be sufficiently clear as to give a fair warning of the 
conduct prohibited, and they must provide a standard or guide against which conduct 
can be uniformly judged by courts and administrative agencies") . 
155. See, e.g., Ambus v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 858 P .2d 1:172, 1 ~n5 (Utah 199~1) 
(discussing a terminated teacher's claim that the state's morality statute was 
u nconstitutionally vague as applied to his termination for a n a rres t tor dist ributing 
marijuana, which was eventually expunged). 
156. See Thompson v. Sw. Sch. Dist., 48:3 F. Supp. 1170, 1178 (W.D. Mo. 1980); 
A mbus, 858 P.2d a t 1375. 
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vague, 157 other courts have held statutory morals clauses to be 
unconstitutionally vague, as they fail to give notice as to the 
immoral conduct that is prohibited under the statutes. 158 One 
such case is Burton v. Cascade School District Union High 
School No. 5, where a teacher was dismissed from her teaching 
position at a public high school on grounds that she was a 
homosexual, which allegedly constituted immoral conduct 
under Oregon's statute governing grounds for dismissals of 
teachers. 159 The Burton court found that the statute vested in 
the school board the power to dismiss teachers for immorality, 
but failed to define immorality. 16° 
As the court explained: 
Immorality means different things to different people and its 
definition depends on the idiosyncrasies of the individual 
school board members. It may be applied so broadly that 
every teacher in the state could be disciplined. The potential 
for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is inherent in 
such a statute. 161 
The court determined that the statute was so broad as to 
make those "charged with its enforcement the arbiters of 
morality for the entire community." 162 In conclusion, the court 
held that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because it 
failed to give fair warning of what conduct was prohibited, and 
because it permitted "erratic and prejudiced exercises of 
authority." 163 
Rather than finding entire statutory morals clauses 
unconstitutionally vague, like the Burton court, other courts 
have found that such statutes do not violate procedural due 
157. See, e.g. , Sullivan v. Meade County lndep. Sch . Dist. No. 101, 387 F. Supp. 
1237, 1247 (D.S .D. 1975) (finding that a statute pursuant to which a teacher was 
dismissed for immorality as a r esult of living with her boyfriend was not so vague as to 
violate the due process clause); see also San Filippo, 961 F.2d at 1127 (stating that 
"provisions permitting discharge for immoral conduct, just cause or conduct 
unbecoming a teacher ... have been upheld against void for vagueness attacks in cases 
involving the discharge of teachers, professors and other public employees"). 
158. See Burton v. Cascade Sch. Dist. Union High Sch. No. 5, 353 F. Supp. 254, 
254-55 (D . Or. 1973) (construing Oregon's statute t hat provided in pertinent part that 
"[d]uring the period of the contract ... the district school board shall dismiss t eachers 
only for . .. immorality"). 
159. ld. 
160. ld. at 255. 
Hil. ld . 
162. Id. 
16:3. Id. 
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process, through a narrow construction of said statutes. 164 
Specifically, these courts have found a legislative intent "to 
allow dismissal only in instances where immoral conduct 
adversely affected a teacher's performance." 165 In these cases, 
claims of vagueness are "resolved by a more precise judicial 
construction and application of the statute in conformity with 
legislative objectives." 166 
Although there has been some variance with respect to 
courts' decisions on procedural due process claims regarding 
the discipline or termination of secondary and postsecondary 
educators, several unifying principles are clear. First, in order 
for an educator to be entitled to procedural due process, that 
educator must have "a legitimate claim of entitlement" to a 
benefit-in other words, the educator must have a legitimate 
property or liberty interest at stake. 167 Tenure has been held to 
constitute a valid property interest to necessitate the 
requirements of constitutional procedural due process. 168 
However, tenure is not the only constitutional property interest 
for educators. 169 Once a sufficient constitutional interest has 
been established, procedural due process requires that the 
educator be given adequate notice and an opportunity to be 
heard. 17° Finally, due process requires that the morals clause 
at Issue, whether statutory or contractual, not be 
unconstitutionally vague. 171 As such, state legislatures, 
governmental attorneys, and educational agencies should be 
mindful of all of these requirements in drafting statutes, 
contracts, or new school policies if such entities wish to avoid a 
potential finding of a Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment 
violation. 
2. Substantive due process 
Educational morals clauses have also been challenged on 
164. See, e.g., Thompson, 483 F. Supp. at1178; Weissman v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Jefferson City. Sch. Dist., 547 P.2d 1267 (Colo. 1976). 
165. Thompson, 483 F. Supp. at 1178. 
166. Morrison, 461 P.2d at 390. 
167. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. 
168. San Filippo, 961 F.2d at 1134. 
169. See, e.g., Stovall, 602 So. 2d at 407 (considering expectancy of employment as 
a property interest). 
170. See, e.g., Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552. 
171. See Burton, 353 F. Supp. at 254-55. 
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the grounds that they violate substantive due process. 172 This 
component of due process requires that the termination of a 
secondary or postsecondary educator's property interest not be 
"arbitrary, capncwus, or without a rational basis." 173 
Additionally, dismissal or discipline of an educator will be 
deemed to violate substantive due process if such action "is 
trivial, or is unrelated to the educational process or to working 
relationships with the education institution, or is wholly 
unsupported by a basis or fact." 174 
To illustrate, in Fisher v. Snyder, a school board's refusal to 
renew a nontenured high school teacher's contract was held to 
violate her substantive due process rights because such refusal 
was arbitrary and capricious in nature. 175 The teacher was a 
middle-aged divorcee who lived by herself in a one-bedroom 
apartment. 176 On "several occasions, young ladies, married 
couples , and young men who were friends of her son" stayed 
overnight at the teacher's apartment. 177 Subsequently, the 
school board dismissed the teacher for unbecoming conduct 
outside the classroom. 178 The school board justified the 
dismissal with a claim that the teacher's actions of allowing 
overnight guests in her home could potentially lead to sexual 
misconduct. 179 However, the board did not accuse the teacher of 
immoral conduct, and there was no proof of improper 
conduct. 180 As such, the "district court held the dismissal 
impermissible as arbitrary and capricious in violation of [the 
teacher's] right to substantive due process," and the district 
court's decision was upheld on substantive due process grounds 
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 181 
The courts will, however, be less inclined to find that the 
enforcement of a morals clause violates the substantive due 
process rights of a secondary or postsecondary educator if no 
172. See, e.g., Hainline , 824 P.2d at 959. 
173. Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents , 159 F.3d 504, 528 (lOth Cir. Kan. 1998). 
Moreover, while "a school board may legitimately inquire into the character and 
integrity of its teachers," the decisions made in such an inquiry cannot be arbitrary or 
capricious. Fisher v. Snyder, 476 F.2d 375, 377 (8th Cir. 1973). 
174. Fisher, 476 F.2d at 377. 
175. Id. at 376. 
176. Id. 
177. Fisher, 476 F.2d at 376. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 377. 
180. ld. 
181. Id. at 376. 
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constitutionally protected right is involved, as was the case in 
Hainline v. Bond. 182 The teacher in Hainline claimed, 
somewhat enigmatically, that the school board's actions of 
suspending his teacher's license, pursuant to a statutory 
morality clause, after he was arrested for burglary and theft, 
deprived him of substantive due process. 183 The Hainline court, 
in finding that no substantive due process violation existed, 
noted that there was no argument that the burglary and theft 
involved some constitutionally protected right of conduct like 
free speech or free association. 184 
As such, these two sample cases demonstrate that 
termination based on "immoral conduct" can form the basis for 
a successful substantive due process claim if (1) a 
constitutionally protected right is at issue in the case, and (2) 
the school acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Future 
court cases, based on statutory and contractual morals clauses, 
will no doubt define the contours of the substantive due process 
standard. 
B. Privacy Rights 
A recurring controversy involving morals clauses for 
teachers is whether a particular statutory or contractual 
morality provision violates the teacher's fundamental right of 
privacy. The constitutional right of privacy, stemming from the 
Fourteenth Amendment, refers to "a right of personal privacy, 
or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy." 185 Rights of 
personal privacy include "the interest in independence in 
making certain kinds of important decisions." 186 Specifically, 
the fundamental, constitutional right of privacy protects 
individuals against government interference in personal 
decisions in marriage, 187 procreation, 188 contraception, 189 child 
rearing and education. 190 
182. 824 P.2d at 959. 
183. Id. at 963. 
184. Id. at 964. 
185. Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) ("The Court has recognized that a right 
of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under 
the Constitution."). 
186. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). 
187. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
188. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942). 
189. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
190. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
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Morals clauses for teachers have been held to violate some 
of these constitutionally protected areas, like the right to 
obtain a divorce 191 and the right to procreate. 192 For example, 
in Ponton v. Newport News Schools, the plaintiff teacher 
claimed that the school violated her constitutional right to 
privacy "by forcing her to take a leave of absence from her 
teaching position because she was single and pregnant." 193 This 
leave of absence was pursuant to a personnel "policy" regarding 
unwed, pregnant teachers, in which these teachers could "(1) 
get married, (2) take a leave of absence, or (3) resign."194 The 
Court held that the "plaintiffs constitutional right of privacy 
was violated when she was forced to take the leave." 195 
Although there have been cases in which an educator's 
right to privacy has been violated pursuant to the exercise of 
educational morals clauses, it is important to keep in mind that 
the right of privacy, like other constitutional rights, is not 
absolute. 196 State regulations that engage areas addressed by 
the constitutional right to privacy may be permissible if such 
regulation is justified by a compelling state interest. 197 
Further, as with substantive due process claims, courts are less 
inclined to find that morality as a condition of employment 
violates a teacher's privacy rights if no fundamental right is 
involved. 198 Clearly, the claims of infringement of secondary 
and postsecondary educators' constitutional, fundamental 
rights to privacy will continue to be litigated under the 
statutory and morals clause context. How these rights will be 
defined, expanded, or restricted in both the public and private 
191. In Littlejohn v. Rose, 768 F.2d 765 (6th Cir. 1985), a nontenured teacher 
brought an action for reinstatement of her job after she was terminated based on her 
decision to seek a divorce. The Court held th at a material question existed a s to 
whethe r the refusal to rehire the teacher was based on her constitutionally protected 
decision to seek a divorce and reversed the directed verdict of the trial court . 
192. Ponton v. Newport News Sch. , 632 F . Supp. 1056 (E.D. Va. 1986). 
193. !d. at 1058. 
194. ld. at 1059. 
195. I d . at 1063. 
196. See Ca rey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977). 
197. See id. 
198. See Lile, 701 S.W.2d a t 506. ln Lile, a tenured teacher was te rminated for 
immor a l conduct after a sexu al abuse complaint was filed against him. The teacher 
claimed that hi s constitutional right to privacy was violated as the alleged conduct took 
place wi thin hi s home, where he had a legitimate expecta tion of privacy . The court 
rejected this claim and found no violation of the teacher's constitutional right to 
privacy as the conduct for which the t eacher sought protection did not involve a 
funda mental right. 
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school arenas will be of key interest to all involved in 
education. 
C. Freedom of Speech 
The constitutionally protected right to free speech may be 
regulated in "carefully restricted circumstances."199 However, 
this does not preclude the potential of freedom of speech issues 
arising when there is a requirement that teachers comply with 
moral clauses for continued employment. Indeed, "First 
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment, are available to 
teachers and students."200 
The specific issue of whether enforcement of a morals 
clause violates a teacher's First Amendment free speech rights 
was addressed by the Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of 
Education. 201 In Pickering, the Board of Education of an Illinois 
school district dismissed a high school teacher for writing and 
publishing in a local newspaper a letter regarding "a recently 
proposed tax increase that was critical of the way in which the 
Board and the district superintendent of schools had handled 
past proposals to raise new revenue for the schools ."202 The 
dismissal resulted from a post-hearing Board determination 
that the letter was "detrimental to the efficient operation and 
administration of the schools."203 The dismissed teacher 
brought suit, claiming that his First Amendment rights had 
been violated.204 The Supreme Court agreed, stating that 
teachers may not be constitutionally compelled to relinquish 
the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as 
non-teacher citizens.205 Consequently, the Court determined 
that the school district's actions violated the teacher's right to 
exercise free speech.206 
However, if the court determines that the teacher's 
199. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
200. Id. at 506. 
201. 39 1 U.S. 563 (1968). 
202. Id. at 564. 
203. !d. 
204. Id. 
205. ld. at 568. 
206. !d. at 574 ("[A]bsent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made .. 
. a teacher's exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not 
furnish the basis for his dismissal from public e mployment."). 
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behavior is outside of the protection provided for under the 
First Amendment, the free speech claim will not be 
successful. 207 The case of Palo Verde Unified School District v. 
Hensey demonstrates this point. In Hensey, a permanent junior 
college professor was dismissed for immoral conduct, which 
included stating to his philosophy class that the district 
superintendent spent too much time "licking up the board" and, 
in connection with this statement, licking the classroom wall 
with his tongue in an up and down manner to show that the 
school superintendent would rather curry favor with his 
superiors than perform his duties.208 The court determined 
that the teacher's actions were not protected under the First 
Amendment as they "passed the limits of bad taste and 
vulgarity" and constituted an obscene incident that indicated 
both "immorality" and "evident unfitness."209 In examining the 
case law regarding the interrelationship between educator 
disciplinary action, morality, and First Amendment speech 
rights , one can note the demarcation of limits of protection for 
educators in this arena, similar to due process and privacy 
rights. 
D. Freedom of Association 
Although a school board may legitimately inquire about the 
character and integrity of teachers,210 imposing morals clauses 
on teachers as a condition of employment can elicit concerns 
about constitutional violations of the right of freedom of 
association. Freedom of association has two different 
meanings.211 "Under the personal liberty prong of freedom of 
association, 'choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate 
human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion 
by the State.'"212 The relationships that have been deemed to 
carry the highest, constitutional protection are "those that 
attend the creation and sustenance of a family-marriage, 
childbirth, the raising and education of children, and 
207 . See, e.g., Palo Verde Unifie d Sch. Dist. v. Hensey, 9 Cal. App . 3d 967 (1970) . 
208. Id . at 969, 974. 
209. Id. a t 974- 75 . 
210. Fisher, 476 F.2d at 377 . 
211. Weeks v. City of P lano, No. 88 C 0518, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8914, a t *6 
(Aug. 6, 1988) . 
212. l d. (quoting Roberts v. United St ates J aycees, 468 U. S. 609, 617- 18 (1984)). 
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cohabitation with one's relatives."213 Conversely, employer-
employee relationships are not entitled to constitutional 
protections of freedom of association. 214 
Non-marital relationships have been held to be entitled to 
an intermediate level of constitutional protection between 
those relationships warranting maximum constitutional 
protection and those requiring no constitutional protections.2 15 
The court in Sullivan v. Meade County Independent School 
District was presented with the issue of whether the 
constitutional rights of an unmarried teacher were violated 
when she was dismissed from employment for cohabitation 
with her boyfriend.216 The court, employing the intermediate 
level of scrutiny for this type of association, determined that 
the teacher's constitutional rights were not violated because 
the teacher's conduct had a relationship to her fitness to 
teach.217 
The other prong of associational freedom involves the "right 
to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities 
protected by the First Amendment such as speech, assembly, 
petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of 
religion."218 A violation of this prong will exist when a 
secondary or postsecondary educator is compelled "to disclose 
his every associational tie."219 An illustration of such a 
violation is Shelton v. Tucker, where the court held 
unconstitutional an Arkansas statute that required teachers to 
disclose any and all organizations with which they had been 
affiliated within the past five years.220 
E. Equal Protection 
Finally, requiring that teachers satisfy certain moral 
standards in order to maintain employment may infringe upon 
the teachers' equal protection rights. The guarantee to equal 
213. Roberts , 468 U.S. at 619. 
214. ld. at 620. 
215. See id.; see also Kukla v. Viii. of Antioch, 647 F. Supp. 799, 808 (N.D. Ill. 
1986). 
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218. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618. 
219. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 4 79, 485-·86 (1960). 
220. Id. at 490. 
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protection under the law means that "no person or class of 
persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws which 
is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like 
circumstances in their lives, liberty, and property and in their 
pursuit of happiness."22l 
A typical scenario involving equal protection challenges for 
requiring morals clauses for teachers has involved the 
fundamenta l right to procreate.222 This right to procreate 
usually involves teachers that become parents out of wedlock, 
as in Avery v. Homewood City Board of Education, where a 
school board discharged an unwed teacher after she informed 
the board that she was pregnant.223 However, the enforcement 
of morals clauses after a teacher has exercised his or her 
fundamental right to procreate is not only limited to unwed 
teachers as the case involving Kelly Romenesko illustrates-as 
previously discussed in Part IV. 224 No doubt this area of 
jurisprudence will be expanded as contractual morals clauses 
proliferate as conditions of secondary and postsecondary 
education. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Morals clauses are regularly enforced upon teachers of 
secondary and postsecondary schools through state statutes. 
However, these clauses are occasionally created through 
contractual provisions where the teacher agrees to comply with 
prescribed moral standards. In certain instances, morals 
clauses can benefit all of the parties involved in the educational 
process such as a situation where it is used to protect students 
from environments where teachers misuse their power to 
commit criminal or harmful acts against the students. Also, 
morals clauses can act as protectors of the reputation of the 
221. Purifoy v. State Bd. of Educ. , 106 Cal. Rptr. 201, 206-07 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973). 
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teaching profession and as protectors of the financial interests 
of schools. 
Nevertheless, morals clauses can significantly limit a 
teacher's activity including activity conducted in their private 
lives. The vexing question of whether a teacher bargained for 
an around the clock job as a role model has been posed with 
differing responses. Some would argue that the right to delve 
into the personal lives of teachers comes concomitantly with 
the job itself since they serve as role models to the students. On 
the other hand, others would argue that the right to limit a 
teacher's behavior should end when the teacher leaves the 
school grounds. 
No matter which position is taken, courts will not uphold a 
morals clause that violates a teacher's constitutional rights, 
such as the rights to due process, privacy, freedom of speech, 
freedom of association, and equal protection. Given the 
constitutional implications that can arise, schools must proceed 
cautiously when enforcing morals clauses and moral-based 
polices against secondary and postsecondary educators. 
